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Abstract: Zeno’s paradoxes are explained as being the result of inappropriate combinations of 
discrete and continuous mathematical systems. It is proposed that the historical background of 
this confusion lies in the course of development of the number system, which was originally 
created to model discrete elements of experience such as apples and people, and only later, by 
the invention of standards of measurement, was expanded to be applied to continuous entities 
such as water, grain and distance. This also made it possible to combine number theory and 
geometry. While this modification of the system was generally unproblematic, it led to subtle 
contradictions when applied to time, space and motion. Analysis of these contradictions and the 
various resolutions that have been offered for them furthers our understanding of number 
systems and their relationship to physical experience. It is argued that in spite of the success of 
discrete systems, a truly continuous mathematical system, such as that of Carathéodory, is a 
more appropriate model of the continuous aspects of the physical world.
Introduction
The number system originated to deal with discrete objects, and only later was it adapted to 
continuous entities. Integers were first invented to compare collections of discrete objects such as 
apples, sheep  and people. By counting, it became possible to determine whether there were 
enough horses for everyone to ride on without having to stand each person next to a horse. It 
became possible for a shepherd to tell whether all his sheep were back from the pasture without 
having to remember the name of each one. First, a list of number words such as “one, two, three” 
and so on had to be memorized. These are inherently arbitrary signs, whose significance resides 
only in their being memorized in a specific order (Wittgenstein, 1958). By putting the members 
of discrete collections into one-to-one correspondence with these previously memorized number 
words, that is, by “counting”, one is able to compare their sizes.
But what about continuous entities such as rope, water and flour? To compare such 
things, numbers were not sufficient. It was still necessary to compare them directly, as by placing 
two pieces of rope next to one another, two bags of flour on the pans of a balance scale, or to 
resort to indirect comparison, as by pouring two quantities of water alternately into the same 
container and seeing which rose higher. The invention of standards of measurement addressed 
this problem. Units of measurement turn continuous quantities into discrete ones, making it 
possible to count meters of rope, kilograms of flour and liters of water. With the help of units of 
measurement, everything that could be done with discrete things could be done with continuous 
ones as well. The application of the number system had been extended. This new application 
then led to the expansion of the number system itself by motivating the invention of rational 
numbers to measure quantities smaller than the established units.
Time and its measurement lie somewhere in between. Time is experienced as continuous, 
but unlike water and rope, there are natural units. Days, months and years are all derived from 
natural phenomena that occur at regular intervals, and therefore lend themselves to serve as a 
basis by which to measure other changes. These phenomena, the cycles of the sun and moon, are 
such a striking part of human experience that it is impossible to fail to notice them. Even the 
most primitive cultures therefore measure the passage of days, months and years. That is to say, 
there is a natural discreteness about the experience of time. Time also differs in yet a more 
essential way. Time is not a material. Indeed, it is not even a phenomenon, but rather an abstract 
concept. What is experienced is change, not the flow of some material called “time”. There is 
always the experience of the present, the memory of the past, and the expectation of the future. It 
is the human mind that synthesizes them and creates the concept of time (Carr, 1912; Harré, 
1996; cf. also von Wright, 1969).
But, while the invention of standards of measurement is an excellent practical solution to 
the problem of applying numbers to continuous entities, it may lead to the illusion that they are 
in fact collections of discrete objects. Measurement tends to conceal the essential difference 
between the equality of discrete entities and that of continuous ones. Discrete equality is, by 
definition, exact. It is arrived at by putting two discrete collections into one-to-one 
correspondence with each other. Equality of continuous entities may be exact, but more often it 
incorporates a degree of tolerance of deviation. If there are ten people and ten horses, then each 
person gets a horse to ride. Exactly one. There are no horses left over and no one has to walk. 
But if there are ten quarts of water, each person need not get exactly one. Units of measurement 
make continuous entities functionally discrete but not actually so. They make it possible to treat 
them as if they were, but do not make them so in fact. Measurement is meant to be a practical 
technique. It is not designed to reveal essential truths about the physical world. The illusion that 
continuous entities are in fact collections of discrete objects is of no practical harm. Commerce 
and even dosages of medicine work even if the measurements are not exact. But when it comes 
to philosophical arguments, this can lead to serious errors. 
That illusion is not produced by the institution of measurement itself. Standards of 
measurement in themselves do not imply exactness. The ancient Babylonian merchant, who had 
learnt to measure grain as earlier he had been able to count sheep, would probably not have 
claimed that each measure of grain was exactly the same. Indeed, no two sheep are exactly the 
same either. All he was interested in was the practical technology of counting for the purpose of 
commerce. The fact that an animal is a natural unit while a measure of grain is an artifact was 
only incidental. All that mattered was that it rendered grain discrete and therefore countable. 
Standards of measurement, therefore, contain the seeds of future error, but the proper soil is yet 
required for them to bear fruit.
It was in classical Greek culture that the confusion arose, for there these two kinds of 
applied mathematics, discrete and continuous, gave rise to two corresponding branches of 
abstract mathematics, number theory and geometry. These were already being developed by the 
time of  Pythagoras, and are most familiar to us through the works of Euclid, who compiled them 
several centuries later. The use of geometric configurations to symbolize the propositions of 
number theory  may have contributed to conceptual crossing over between number theory and 
geometry. Classical mathematical notation was too crude and cumbersome to conveniently 
express the properties of number theory. It tended to obscure relationships between numbers 
rather than reveal them. The use of geometric configurations instead was a clever solution, but it 
also invited confusion. Counting objects in an array is a discrete operation. It has nothing to do 
with the sizes of the objects counted or the distances between them. It only involves their 
number. Geometry, on the other hand, deals with distance, area, and angle, which are continuous. 
But since the shapes of the arrays used in classical number theory also appear in geometry, there 
is a large body of analysis that is common to the two.
Within geometry itself another confusion developed. Even though the physical world is 
actually three dimensional, there are physical situations from which the concepts of one and two 
dimensional forms can be abstracted. Land area is two dimensional, and distance is one 
dimensional. The concept of a dimensionless point follows, for the intersection of two lines is a 
point. Abstract geometry involves the combination of forms of differing dimensions, lines 
together with planes, planes and lines with solids. Each is discrete relative to those of higher 
dimension. Points on a line and lines on a plane are discrete objects. Not so segments of a line or 
two-dimensional forms within a plane, which are continuous. The combination of objects of 
different dimensionality, such as points and lines, in a single system tends therefore to lead to 
contradictions.
The Greeks soon became aware of the contradictions into which the marriage of discrete 
and continuous systems was leading them. These were expressed by Zeno in his four paradoxes 
of motion: the race course, Achilles and the tortoise, the arrow, and the stadium. Though it is 
primarily the paradox of the arrow that is of interest to us here, the others  need to be discussed 
as well. In the second and most famous, Achilles, the fastest of mortals, is to run a race with a 
tortoise. Since the tortoise is so slow, it is given a head start. Now, we all know that Achilles will 
soon catch up with the tortoise and overtake it, but Zeno argued that if distance could be 
continually divided and redivided, that would be logically impossible. By the time Achilles 
reaches the tortoise's starting point, the tortoise has moved on, even if only a very short distance, 
so Achilles has not yet caught up. He keeps running and reaches the spot where the tortoise was 
then, but again it has moved ahead, so he runs further. This happens over and over. However 
close they are, the relationship between them remains the same; only the distance changes. The 
number of ‘runs’ is endless. No matter how many Achilles has covered there will always be 
another. As there is never a last ‘run’, the race is never over and Achilles never catches up with 
the tortoise. 
The paradox of the race course presents a similar problem. Here, a would-be runner is to 
run a course from start to finish. But before he can complete the whole course he must cover half 
of it, before that one quarter, before that one eighth and so on. Since there is no end to these 
divisions, there is no first stretch for him to cover. He is in even worse shape than Achilles, 
because not only does he not reach his goal, he never even gets started.
In the third paradox, Zeno has us consider an arrow flying through the air. At any 
moment the arrow occupies a certain single location, exactly equal in size to that of the arrow 
itself. At that moment there is no difference between the flying arrow and one that is stationary at 
that spot. Each occupies but one location at any given moment. At each moment, then, the arrow 
is not moving. But since the entire flight of the arrow is made up of the sum of these moments, 
the arrow is never moving. How, asked Zeno, can an arrow that is always standing still get from 
one place to another?
Although classical philosophy did not explicitly articulate the concepts ‘continuous’ and 
‘discrete’, the extended discussion of which these paradoxes were a part clearly involved them. 
The classical concept most closely related was that of divisibility. The question was whether the 
physical world could be divided over and over again without end, or whether eventually some 
smallest indivisible unit would be reached. The first two paradoxes argue against infinite 
divisions, corresponding to a continuous view of the world, the third against minimal units. It is 
not clear what Zeno intended to prove by these arguments. Extensive discussion of the historical 
question can be found in Tannery (1987), Owen (1970), Papa-Grimaldi (1996), Arntzenius 
(2000), Glazebrook (2001), and other sources. But however the paradoxes are interpreted, each 
involves a combination of discrete and continuous descriptions, and it is that combination that 
produces the paradox.
Each of these three paradoxes involves an infinite summation, the adding together of an 
endless collection. This is a discrete concept, involving the discrete operation of addition. The 
problem of how such a summation can ever be completed immediately arises. If the terms are to 
be added one by one, the sum can never be completed because there is no last term. In the arrow 
paradox, the problem is compounded by the introduction of another discrete concept, that of 
dimensionless points or moments. The first two paradoxes involve summations of successively 
smaller terms, each of which, however, has extension. Here, beside being infinitely many, the 
parts of which the  line is imagined to consist are unextended points. This is problematic even 
without applying it to physical entities such as ropes or lines drawn on paper. How can a line be 
composed of dimensionless points, since a sum of zeros, no matter how many, can never add up 
to anything other than zero?
Resolving the Paradoxes - A Discrete Resolution
There are two basic approaches to resolving these paradoxes, and each has had adherents since 
antiquity. Essentially, one approach rejects the continuous description in favor of the discrete, 
and the other the discrete in favor of the continuous.
One early and brilliant discrete solution is provided by atomism (Owen, 1970). The 
classical atomists and their followers in later periods held that matter is composed of very small 
indivisible parts, so it cannot be divided and redivided forever. Eventually the smallest units of 
matter will be reached and it will not be divisible any more. The atomist description applies not 
only to matter but to time and space as well. Rather than being viewed as continua, they are seen 
as being composed of discrete moments and discrete locations that cannot be divided further. 
Time is in fact like the separate frames of a motion picture, and it is only our perception that 
makes it appear smooth. So too, space is like the pixels of a digital image. That we are unable to 
see the spaces between them is not just a practical limitation of our nervous systems, but the 
essential limitation of our existence, since we ourselves are composed of exactly those units of 
time and space. There might be miles between one unit of space and the next, and millennia 
between an instant and the one that follows it, yet it would be essentially unknowable for us, 
since we ourselves do not exist there. Indeed, the very idea of time and space between the units is 
meaningless, since nothing at all exists between them. It is but the error of an imagination that 
still considers existence to be continuous and has not fully grasped the concept of atomism 
(Arntzenius, 2000; cf. von Wright, 1969). 
According to this position, the problems of the paradoxes are illusory. In the first two 
paradoxes, the description itself is fallacious. The length of the race course cannot in fact be 
divided endlessly. Eventually the length of the division is a single unit of space, and then the 
process must stop. So too, when the distance between Achilles and the tortoise is only one unit 
he will catch up on the next ‘run’.
As for the arrow, motion is indeed an illusion, if by motion one means continuous change 
of position. The reality of motion is that the moving object occupies successive positions in 
space at successive moments in time. This is what we perceive as motion. Whether the number 
of positions of the arrow as it moves from one end of its path to the next is finite, as some 
atomists maintained, or infinite, the source of the paradox is a misunderstanding of the true 
nature of motion. It is not a smooth changing of position, as it appears to be, but a succession of 
separate abrupt changes.
It was against the atomist position that the fourth paradox, the paradox of the stadium, 
was directed. If there are three rows of men aligned with one another in a stadium, one marching 
in one direction, another at the same rate in the opposite direction, and the third standing still, 
what happens in the smallest unit of time? If, relative to one another, the moving rows have 
advanced by one minimal unit of distance, then relative to the stationary one they have only 
moved half a unit, which contradicts the assumption that the unit is minimal (Tannery, 1987; 
Owen, 1970; Glazebrook, 2001). To maintain the atomist position, one is forced to say that in the 
minimal time unit the two moving rows advance two units relative to one another, and that there 
is no time unit in which their relative motion is only one.
There seems, in principle, to be no way of refuting this form of atomism, since, if it is 
true, our existence is entirely within the discrete atomic world, so there is no way for us to see 
the transition between atoms. Furthermore, it cannot be refuted practically by making very small 
divisions, since however small a division we succeed in making, it can be argued that the atoms 
are smaller yet. On the other hand, unless some proof for atomism is devised, we are inclined to 
consider the perceived continuity of space and time to reflect reality.
A Continuous Resolution
The opposite approach was taken by Aristotle. In the Sixth Book of Physics, in the course of 
presenting a theory of space, time and matter, he resolves the paradoxes within an internally 
consistent continuous system. The first two paradoxes are answered by rejecting the need for a 
discrete additive process for the composition of a continuum. Even though any continuum can be 
divided endlessly, that is only a potential. Zeno presented it as if all the potential divisions had 
actually been made, and therefore needed to be recomposed, but Aristotle maintained  that the 
motion of a moving body does not consist of separate events. Achilles’ motion is a single smooth 
run, as is that of the runner on the race course. Since it is not really composed of separate ‘runs’, 
there is no need to add them together. Furthermore, however many divisions are made, they are 
smaller and smaller and their sum is always just that of the original distance. It is only the 
artificial division that causes motion to appear paradoxical (Glazebrook, 2001). Space, time and 
motion are really continuous, and it is only when they are erroneously described as being discrete 
that there is a problem. The fallacy in the paradoxes of Achilles and of the race course lies 
therefore in the description.
While the discrete approach accounts for the paradox of the arrow in the same way as it 
does the first two, for the continuous approach this third paradox requires a different kind of 
solution. Here, one is dealing with instantaneous moments rather than smaller and smaller but 
always measurable intervals. The problem is the opposite of that of the first two. How can the 
sum be other than zero? The problem of composing a time period from instantaneous moments is 
the same as that of composing a line from dimensionless points. Aristotle’s answer is again to 
eliminate the discrete aspect of the description and maintain that even potentially, a line cannot 
be considered to be composed of points. Since two distinct points cannot touch one another, 
there must always be something between them. So even though there are infinite points on the 
line, the line is composed not of these points but of the distances between them (Arntzenius, 
2000; Glazebrook, 2001).
Comparison of the Two Approaches
Atomist and continuous solutions both succeed for the same reason. In each of the four 
paradoxes, the apparent contradiction is the result of an inconsistent combination of discrete and 
continuous descriptions. The atomist solution is to revise the continuous part and make it 
discrete. The continuous solution is to make the whole thing continuous.
In neither case is there any attempt to explain time itself and how it progresses. The 
passage of time is simply a fact. It is the nature of our existence that we experience change, from 
which we create the concept of  time (von Wright, 1969). It is essentially impossible to 
understand time itself, because we and our processes of observation and of thinking are entirely 
within it. Whether it ‘ticks’ or ‘sweeps’, it keeps moving. But lack of understanding of the 
essence of time neither adds to nor detracts from the force of the paradoxes, and however one 
resolves them, time itself remains a mystery.
These two approaches reflect two radically different attitudes toward knowledge. The 
discrete approach is based upon an idealist doctrine, such as that of  Pythagoras, that the physical 
world is derived from numbers, and ultimately, from the number one (Tannery, 1987; 
Glazebrook, 2001). Beginning a priori with such a doctrine, experience is forced to conform to it. 
Since the number system is discrete, the world must be discrete too. Indeed, the paradoxes may 
have been directed against exactly this position, Zeno’s argument being that any application of 
discrete mathematical operations to the continuous physical world is bound to produce a 
contradiction. According to this interpretation, the concepts of ‘one’ and ‘many’ used by Zeno 
and his teacher, Parmenides, were close, if not identical, to the concepts of ‘continuous’ and 
‘discrete’ (Papa-Grimaldi, 1996).  But the adherents of the discrete position, rather than 
relinquishing it, responded by further removing continuity from their description of the physical 
world.
The continuous position is derived from the physical experience that there exist some 
entities that can be divided and redivided, the resulting parts always being divisible themselves. 
Extrapolation from this experience implies the reality of continuity, and experience is given 
preference over any a priori system (Glazebrook, 2001). Aristotle saw that the source of the 
contradiction lay in the introduction of entities such as points and operations such as addition, 
derived from a discrete formal system, into the continuous system derived from physical 
experience. He addressed the problem by limiting the application of discrete entities and 
operations, in the one case by asserting that a continuum could not be composed of points, and in 
the other by denying the necessity of performing infinitely many discrete additions to compose a 
whole. He did not, however, exclude discrete aspects entirely, limiting them, rather, only as 
much as he considered necessary to avoid contradiction.
Seeing the Problem as One of Representation 
The ancient philosophers considered the subject of the paradoxes to be the physical world itself, 
the question being whether it was endlessly divisible or not. Their arguments, however, dealt not 
with the physical world but with descriptions of it, their goal being to prove or disprove the 
consistency of those descriptions. Indeed, the same can be said of most later discussions of the 
paradoxes. The real question is therefore whether or not it is possible to construct a description 
of the physical world that is internally consistent. The paradoxes argue that it is not, because any 
description will contain elements that contradict one another. The resolutions are achieved by 
modifying the descriptions to make them internally consistent (Salmon, 1970).
Viewing the problem as one of representation is a radical departure from the traditional 
interpretation of its being a question about the physical world itself. There are now two separate 
questions, one being whether a particular description is internally consistent and the other being 
whether it is an appropriate description of the physical world. Is that the way the world really is? 
These two questions are, of course, not independent. If a description is not internally consistent it 
cannot be appropriate, since the world itself is not inconsistent. However, internal consistency 
alone does not make it so (Salmon, 1970). 
This view implies, moreover, that there may be more than one valid resolution of the 
paradoxes. Consistency and appropriateness alone do not guarantee that a description is unique. 
There may be more that one consistent and appropriate description of the physical world. It is 
well known that there are many things that can be described in more than one way, each way 
being an appropriate description as well as being internally consistent. Sometimes, different 
descriptions address different aspects. For example, political and topographic maps represent 
different aspects of the same continent. In other cases various descriptions address the same 
aspect, but in different ways. A complex number, for example, can be described using either 
polar or rectangular coordinates. For the paradoxes too, therefore, there may be two or more 
resolutions.
Those, past and present, who imagine that by achieving consistency they have identified 
the unique true nature of the world have fallen into the  common error of confusing description 
with its referent. Tannery (1987) and others after him (Salmon, 1970; Papa-Grimaldi, 1996; 
Glazebrook, 2001) have attributed a certain degree of this insight to Zeno himself. According to 
this interpretation, the purpose of Zeno’s arguments was not to prove that motion was 
impossible, nor that the world was neither continuous nor atomic, but rather that mathematics 
was  incapable of providing a consistent description of physical reality. What Zeno was doing, 
then, was demonstrating a limitation of mathematics. He was not addressing the nature of the 
physical world at all. Even this very generous interpretation of Zeno falls short of the complete 
insight, the problem being seen only as one of mathematics rather than of description in general. 
However, if indeed this was Zeno’s intention, he came about as close to identifying the problem 
as one lacking the concepts of continuous and discrete systems could have. If so, however, he 
was not understood by subsequent philosophers, and the insight latent in it remained unnoticed 
for over two millennia (Glazebrook, 2001).
The Ascent of Discrete Mathematics
Symbols are tools of the mind, increasing its power to manipulate and analyze concepts, but in 
doing so they bias it to certain attitudes and modes of thinking. Since the introduction of Arabic 
numerals in the Middle Ages, there has been a continual advance in mathematical notation, 
which has facilitated the advance of mathematics itself. The decimal system made it possible to 
represent arbitrarily large and arbitrarily small quantities and to perform arithmetic operations 
conveniently, which enabled mathematicians to think of numbers without resorting to geometric 
representations. But since these new and powerful symbols were discrete, discrete analysis came 
to increasingly dominate mathematical thought. Most of the currently accepted solutions of the 
paradoxes are therefore discrete ones (Russell, 1993; Zangari, 1994; Papa-Grimaldi, 1996; A 
notable exception was Bergson, 1927, 1992; Carr, 1912; cf. also von Wright, 1969). 
Furthermore, the more powerful the discrete system became, the more it seemed to be the unique 
correct description of the physical world, and the greater the effort it inspired  to model the world 
according to it.
During the nineteenth century, a new definition of continuity itself was developed. 
Largely through the work of Bernard Bolzano (1950), the concept of an extended entity was 
replaced by that of a dense set of points. This was particularly welcome in the development of 
calculus. The intuitive notion of continuity that calculus had relied on until then was problematic 
because it was not compatible with the discrete concept of a function, which takes discrete values 
and yields discrete values as its results. By reconstruing continuous entities such as space and 
time as dense sets of discrete elements, the concept of a continuum was converted from that of an 
extended entity that could be repeatedly redivided but never decomposed into elementary units to 
that of a collection of points, thus making it in effect a discrete concept. By this step, together 
with advances in understanding of convergence and of orders of infinity, it became possible to 
resolve the paradoxes without having to resort to minimal atomic units as classical atomism had.
Several objections were thereby avoided. Since irrational numbers are an uncountable 
infinity, their sum is defined neither by counting nor by a limit of counting, so mathematical 
induction does not apply to them. It can therefore not be argued that the sum of any number of 
zeros is zero. Nor are current discrete approaches subject to the Aristotelian objection that, since 
no two points can be adjacent, some of the line has been left out. That objection can only be 
made if such a missing place on the line can somehow be identified, since it is not meaningful to 
speak of a place on the line unless it can be indicated in some way. That identification can 
certainly not be done by physically pointing to it, since a line is a formal, not a physical, concept. 
It must therefore be done by a number, there being no other kind of description. So the line 
consists exactly of its points, corresponding to the real numbers, rational and irrational, and 
nothing has been left out. Defining a line interval as an uncountably infinite collection of points 
is therefore internally consistent, and can serve both as a rigorous basis for calculus and an 
approach to resolving the paradoxes. 
The success of discrete mathematics left little motivation for the construction of a 
continuous system. However, in the twentieth century Constantin Carathéodory constructed a 
system that, without resorting to dimensionless points, could serve as an alternate basis for 
calculus and physics. It is internally consistent and not subject to the objections of the paradoxes. 
The elements of this system are extended geometric entities, which are not defined in terms of 
end points or boundary lines (Carathéodory, 1963; Arntzenius, 2000). In describing a line, for 
example, segments themselves are elementary objects. While the word “interval”, as used in the 
traditional systems, refers to the region between two values, and must therefore be defined in 
terms of end points, the word “segment” is not defined in that way. Points are therefore not 
required, and need not be included in the system. The concept of continuity in such a system is 
that of an extended entity, not of a dense collection of points.
Why Prefer a Continuous Description?
Given, then, that there are now two kinds of mathematical models, both of which are internally 
consistent and both of which can be used to describe physical phenomena, which is to be 
preferred? At first it would seem to be the discrete ones. Since some aspects of the world, such as 
apples and sheep, are undeniably discrete, no system entirely lacking in discrete aspects can be 
sufficient to represent it. And since those aspects of the world that seem to us to be continuous 
can be successfully described discretely, it is possible, using a discrete system, to apply a single 
mathematical foundation to everything. A continuous description, on the other hand, must 
necessarily be a hybrid. Whatever system it uses to represent the continuous aspects, it must 
include a number system of some sort to represent the discrete ones. Besides being more 
complicated, such a combination tends to lead to inconsistency, as Zeno demonstrated. It would 
seem, therefore, that continuous descriptions should be avoided.
But are discrete models really appropriate descriptions of the physical world? Our 
experience of the world is always three dimensional and always subject to constantly changing 
time. It contains neither points nor durationless instants. Time is always experienced as moving 
and space as having extension. Points in space and instants in time are cultural illusions, 
engendered by discrete descriptions. They are not natural human mistakes. The stone-age artist 
who painted a herd of deer running across the wall of a cave would not have said that they were 
standing still. During the past half century this illusion has been intensified by the proliferation 
of digital computers and the use of digital measuring devices in place of analogue ones. The 
world is viewed increasingly through digital representations rather than directly, and our mode of 
thought and expression becomes increasingly discrete. 
The isolation of separate dimensions is a theoretical concept abstracted from that 
experience. This act of abstraction is similar to other abstractions that we make, and that pervade 
our thought and language. From a triangular piece of wood we abstract the material “wood” and 
the shape “triangle”, but never in our experience is there a triangle that is not made of some 
material nor wood that does not have some shape. That is not to say that shapes, materials and 
dimensions are not real. They are real properties of objects and serve as useful descriptions, but 
they are not objects themselves. They cannot exist except in certain combinations, such as shape 
together with material. So too, the three dimensions and time can only exist together with one 
another. Redefining continuity as density of points does not constitute a deeper understanding of 
the physical reality. What has really been accomplished  is not a description of continuity, but a 
discrete simulation of it.
To build an argument upon the state of an arrow at a particular moment in its flight is like 
basing a proof upon the description of a shapeless piece of wood. Just as it is useful to speak of a 
material or a shape, so too it is useful to speak of locations of a moving arrow. But while we can 
measure a distance and describe it, the arrow never exists at that point alone. In a durationless 
instant there is no arrow, no world, no existence (cf. von Wright, 1969). We might take a 
photograph of the arrow at that point, but the photograph is not an arrow, it is only a picture of an 
arrow. It is a kind of description of an arrow, somewhat like a verbal description.
The concept of instantaneous velocity is useful in analyzing the physical world just as 
standards of measurement are useful in commerce. The fact that a calculus based upon a discrete 
foundation provides us with a way of defining and calculating instantaneous velocity does not 
mean that such a physical reality actually exists. Just as in language it is possible to make up 
words for imaginary objects such as dragons and unicorns, so in mathematics it is possible to 
create models to which nothing in the physical world corresponds (Glazebrook, 2001). The 
usefulness of this definition in physics is comparable to the usefulness of standards of 
measurement in commerce. Neither need be seen as a description of a true essence.
The popularity of discrete systems is part of the tradition that evolved in the course of the 
development of mathematics and physics. From the beginning, classical geometry involved 
interrelationships of elements of different dimensions. Such interrelationships being essential and 
fundamental to it, not merely incidental, their implications could not be escaped, leading 
ultimately to an essentially discrete system. But since the physical world involves only entities of 
three dimensions, such a system cannot be an accurate description of it. Though for one raised in 
the Western scientific tradition the discrete approach may seem natural and appropriate, when 
considered without this bias, a continuous system is a much better description of the physical 
world.
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